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ABSTRACT
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas is hardly known as a warrior
for either the civil rights movement or the African-American
community. The most conservative Justice on the U.S. Supreme
Court, Thomas has consistently voted against what many perceive to
be the interests of African Americans, and he has proudly led the
charge to dismantle the crowning jewels of the civil rights movement,
particularly affirmative action. But Thomas, this Note argues,
nonetheless views himself as both a civil rights leader and an advocate
for the African-American community. He believes that affirmative
action and similar initiatives have obstructed the path to true racial
equality, and he has fully committed himself to clearing the way. To
bolster and legitimize his opposition to affirmative action, Thomas
has relied on the words and principles of John Marshall Harlan, the
Supreme Court’s first civil rights advocate. Although Harlan’s
contemporaries failed to appreciate the wisdom behind his lonesome
dissents, Harlan has since been hailed as a “great dissenter” and a
prophetic champion of civil rights. This Note argues that Thomas,
intrigued by Harlan’s vindication, has appropriated Harlan’s words
and principles in an attempt to secure a similar legacy for himself.
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INTRODUCTION
1

When one thinks about the civil rights heroes of the twentieth
2
and twenty-first centuries, Clarence Thomas, the most conservative
3
U.S. Supreme Court Justice of his time, is unlikely to come to mind.
Indeed, during the course of his legal career, Thomas has made few
4
friends in the African-American community. He has complained that
all civil rights leaders ever do is “bitch, bitch, bitch, moan and moan,
5
whine and whine.” He has vigorously opposed affirmative action,
which
he
condemns
as
paternalistic,
patronizing,
and
6
counterproductive. Moreover, he has openly scorned the reasoning
7
of Brown v. Board of Education, calling the landmark decision and
8
all of its progeny a “missed opportunity.” When Thomas was
1. Technically, the term “civil rights” refers to “[t]he individual rights of personal liberty
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as
by legislation such as the Voting Rights Act.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (8th ed. 2004).
This Note examines “civil rights” in the racial context only. This usage is consistent with the
meaning of “civil rights” in the context of the “civil rights movement,” the organized struggle
for racial equality that began in the 1950s with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and continued through the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968. See generally
RAYMOND D’ANGELO, THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2001) (describing how two
hundred years of racism toward African Americans finally gave way to a formal civil rights
movement in the 1950s).
2. Thomas was nominated to the United States Supreme Court in 1991 by President
George H. W. Bush. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). For a general description of Thomas’s life
and legal career, see CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON (2007); KEVIN MERIDA
& MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT (2007).
3. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 249 (“[Thomas] emerge[d] as what many
legal scholars call the most conservative justice on the court, the one most consistent in hewing
to a strict, unchanging reading of the Constitution.”); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 99–113
(2007) (“[Thomas] was by far the most conservative member of the Rehnquist Court, probably
the most conservative justice since the Four Horsemen, FDR’s nemeses, retired during the New
Deal.”); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT 1–5 (2006) (discussing Thomas’s
zealous devotion to his conservative principles).
4. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 3–4 (“[T]he antipathy toward Thomas
among African Americans is wide and deep and persistent.”).
5. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 183.
6. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]here can be no doubt that racial
paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination. So-called ‘benign’ discrimination teaches many that because of chronic
and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their
patronizing indulgence.”).
7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 991–92 (1987); see also SCOTT
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nominated to the Court in 1991, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), “the nation’s oldest and
9
largest civil rights organization,” opposed his confirmation.
Despite this opposition, Thomas, only the second African
American to serve on the United States’ highest Court, would like
nothing more than to be remembered as a civil rights hero of his
10
time. Thomas sees himself as a courageous soldier of racial
11
equality, selflessly fighting for the natural rights avowed by the
founders of the United States, the abolitionists of the Civil War era,
12
and the civil rights giants of the twentieth century. As such, Thomas
believes that he is fighting for a world in which all classifications on
the basis of race are unconstitutional—a world that he believes the
13
Declaration of Independence promises and the Fourteenth
14
Amendment compels.
DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES 48–51 (1999) (“In many of his speeches and writings,
Thomas has been critical of the modern Supreme Court’s civil rights jurisprudence. He starts at
the beginning, with Brown . . . .”).
9. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 176.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 23 (“The courageous underdog is one of
[Thomas’s] favorite personas, adopted by him in countless speeches and observed by friends in
private conversations. Putting on his battle armor—seeing himself as a man under attack for his
ideas—is one of the ways Thomas copes with the ostracism he endures from blacks who disagree
with him.”).
12. See GERBER, supra note 8, at 41 (“Thomas himself pointed out . . . that political giants
such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Abraham Lincoln, and the Founders of our nation believed that
the Constitution should be interpreted in light of natural law.”); Thomas, supra note 8, at 986
(“[T]o accept Lincoln’s interpretation of the American Founding is not merely to go with the
winner, or indulge in a sentimental reminiscence about the Great Emancipator . . . . [It would
also] preserve what is strongest in the original Civil Rights movement: its insistence that what it
demanded is what America had always promised . . . .”).
13. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text; see also THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . .”).
14. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. The Fourteenth Amendment says that
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Congress proposed
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 and the states ratified thereafter. See ANDREW KULL, THE
COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 82–87 (1992) (describing the proposal and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment). It was added to the Constitution following the Civil War along with
the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 (2d ed. 2005). Scholars sometimes refer to these three amendments
as the “Reconstruction amendments.” See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic
Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753,
838 n.423 (2000) (“Brown reaffirmed the role for the federal government implied in the
Reconstruction amendments by nationalizing civil rights.” (emphasis added)).
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To achieve this racial equality, Thomas believes that the United
States must first tread backward nearly fifty-five years to the Court’s
landmark decision in Brown, where Thomas believes that the fight for
15
racial equality went tragically astray. The “great flaw” of Brown,
according to Thomas, is that the Court did not rely on the lonely
16
17
dissent of John Marshall Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, which
affirmed the importance of the “Founders’ constitutional
18
19
principles,” and rightly declared the Constitution “color-blind.” As
a result, Thomas argues, the Court did not establish a per se rule that
all classifications on the basis of race are unconstitutional, leaving
Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, and the founders’ constitutional
20
principles, unsatisfied. Moreover, Thomas contends, this failure
opened the door for affirmative action and other initiatives designed
to help African Americans adapt to life after segregation—initiatives
that Thomas believes disempowered African Americans and
21
obscured the dream of a colorblind Constitution.
In an effort to remedy Brown’s “great flaw,” Thomas has
borrowed the words and principles of John Marshall Harlan,

15. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 991–92 (“Brown was a missed opportunity, as [was] all its
progeny . . . . The task of those involved in securing the freedom of all Americans is to turn
policy toward reason rather than sentiment, toward justice rather than sensitivity, toward
freedom rather than dependence—in other words, toward the spirit of the Founding. These
steps would validate the Brown decision, by replacing the Warren opinion with one resting on
reason and moral and political principles, as established in the Constitution and the Declaration
of Independence, rather than on feelings.”).
16. John Marshall Harlan was appointed to the Court in 1877 by President Rutherford B.
Hayes, LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 41
(1999), and served until his death in 1911, id. at 188. Harlan’s grandson, John Marshall Harlan II
(Harlan II), served on the Court from 1955 until 1971 and was a consistent dissenter on the
Warren Court. See generally TINSLEY E. YARBOROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1992)
(describing the life and jurisprudence of Harlan II, the “great dissenter” of the Warren Court).
17. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
18. Thomas, supra note 8, at 990.
19. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (“Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens.”).
20. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 991 (“The Brown psychology makes the legal and social
environment all-controlling: ‘the feeling of inferiority’ or ‘the sense of inferiority’ is the
problem. . . . Thus, the Brown focus on environment overlooks the real problem with
segregation, its origin in slavery, which was at fundamental odds with the founding principles.”).
21. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“So-called ‘benign’ discrimination . . .
stamp[s] minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or
to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”).
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22

Thomas’s own judicial hero and the Court’s only civil rights
23
champion at the turn of the twentieth century. Although Harlan’s
contemporaries largely dismissed Harlan as a “moralizing eccentric”
24
during his time on the Court, Brown and its progeny dramatically
vindicated his civil rights dissents, and commentators since Brown
25
have celebrated him as a great prophet of racial equality.
This Note argues that Thomas, during his tenure on the Court,
has used Harlan’s words and principles to manipulate the meaning of
Brown to reflect his own equal protection philosophy. Armed with
Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, Thomas has fought vigorously for
the racial equality that he believes the founders promised in the
Declaration of Independence. Although his cause is unpopular with
his contemporaries, Thomas is confident that one day history will
vindicate his views, and he, like Harlan, will be hailed as a prophetic
26
leader of civil rights.
Part I of this Note describes how Thomas’s life experiences,
particularly his experiences as a racial minority, have greatly
influenced his judicial philosophy. Part II illustrates how Thomas has
used the natural law principles of Harlan and other nineteenthcentury scholars to hone his equal protection philosophy. Part III
argues that Thomas has appropriated Harlan’s colorblind
Constitution to redefine the meaning of Brown to reflect his equal
protection philosophy. Part IV demonstrates that despite the
condemnation he has received from the African-American
community, Thomas believes that he is a prophetic champion of civil
rights, and suggests that Thomas has sacrificed his contemporary
significance on the Court so that he, like Harlan, can have his lonely
civil rights opinions vindicated by history.
I. AN UNLIKELY ADVOCATE
In his memoirs, Thomas recalls a courtesy visit he received upon
his confirmation to the Court from his predecessor, Thurgood

22. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 249–50.
23. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 16, at 8.
24. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 77 (describing how commentators regarded Harlan as a
moralizing eccentric for much of American history).
25. E.g., id. at 80.
26. See infra notes 216–26 and accompanying text.
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Marshall, a “civil rights icon” and the mastermind behind Brown.
The visit “ballooned into a two-and-a-half-hour” discussion, during
which Thomas told Marshall, “I would have been shoulder to
30
shoulder with you back then—if I’d had the courage.” Marshall,
nicknamed “Mr. Civil Rights” for his legal advocacy on behalf of
31
African Americans, apparently responded, “I did in my time what I
32
had to do. . . . You have to do in your time what you have to do.”
Because Thomas was assuming Marshall’s seat on the Court, this
encounter represented a passing of the gavel between Marshall and
his successor. But by Thomas’s account of the visit, strategically
33
placed at the end of his autobiography, Marshall was passing to
Thomas more than his place on the Court—Marshall was passing his
position as a civil rights advocate. Marshall’s words have stayed with
34
Thomas throughout his tenure on the Court. Thomas’s version of
civil rights advocacy, however, was probably not what Marshall, the
revered architect of Brown, had in mind.
To many African Americans, Thomas’s ideology appears cold,
35
radical, and severe. Thomas denounces affirmative action as
patronizing and paternalistic, arguing that special treatment on
account of race can only promote dependency and a sense of
36
entitlement within minority groups. For similar reasons, Thomas has
forcefully condemned public benefit programs designed to assist
37
individuals living below the poverty line, and he has shown no

27. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 3 (“Thomas, a southern black conservative, was George H.
W. Bush’s choice to replace the civil rights icon Thurgood Marshall in 1991.”).
28. Id.; see also U. W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Lawyers, Civil Disobedience, and Equality
in the Twenty-First Century, 54 ALA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2003) (“[Marshall] sacrificed his life to
liberate all Americans from the stains of state-sponsored discrimination.”).
29. For information on Marshall’s role in Brown, see JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 209–25 (1998).
30. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 286.
31. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 9.
32. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 286.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 39.
36. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
37. See Juan Williams, Black Conservatives, Center Stage, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1980, at
A21 (“Thomas is also a man who has a sister on welfare back in his home state of Georgia, but
he feels that he must be opposed to welfare because of the dependency it can breed in a person.
‘She [his sister] gets mad when the mailman is late with her welfare check,’ he says. ‘That is how
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sympathy for those who turn to crime to make ends meet. As one
NAACP leader bemoaned, Thomas “sides in almost every instance
with the powerful over those without power,” voting “directly against
39
the interest of blacks.”
Ironically, however, Thomas has largely built his judicial
philosophy around what he perceives to be the interests of African
Americans; he has simply defined those interests differently. To
achieve a world in which the color of one’s skin is “truly the least
40
important thing about a person,” Thomas argues, “the Constitution
and the nation it form[ed] [must] be interpreted to its highest, not
simply as an efficient functioning instrument that parcels out foods to
41
different competing interest groups.” True racial equality, Thomas
42
believes, requires strict limits on government power. Though some
Americans may suffer as a result of a limited government, Thomas
43
admits, freedom must come at that price.
dependent she is. What’s worse is that now her kids feel entitled to the check too. They have no
motivation for doing better or getting out of that situation.’” (alteration in original)).
38. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The power
to be lenient is [also] the power to discriminate.” (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1993) (internal quotations omitted))); MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 90–91 (“Once
our legal system accepted the general premise that social conditions and upbringing could be
excuses for harmful conduct, the range of causes that might prevent society from holding
anyone accountable for his actions became potentially limitless.” (quoting ClarenceThomas)).
39. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 248 (quoting Wade Henderson, former director
of the Washington bureau of the NAACP).
40. Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough
Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 403 n.3 (1987).
41. Thomas, supra note 8, at 989.
42. See id. (discussing the importance of “good institutions that protect and reinforce good
intentions”).
43. For example, in a lecture at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law in 1994,
Thomas explained:
I do hear quite a bit about freedom and rights but little about th[e] awful
responsibilities and consequences [that come with them]. . . .
. . . We often tell our children that they cannot go to a party or the movies until
some task or chore has been done. And, yet, when we talk about rights and freedom
in the broader context of society, at no time do we seem comfortable mentioning that
some preconditions must be met. But, we all somehow know that freedom and
responsibilities are equally yoked and that only in tandem can they cultivate the vast
fields of opportunity and only in tandem can we expect to have an orderly society or
ordered liberty. And, we all know that though we are all free to sow in the spring,
only those who do so will reap. But, we are far more comfortable bemoaning the poor
harvest of those who have failed to sow than we are at pointing out that one cannot
have one without the other. Nor can we have the society that we cherish if we lose our
will to demand that each individual discharge his responsibility or accept the
consequences for failing to do so.
....
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As is the case with every Justice, Thomas is the product of his
44
unique life experiences. His political ideology and judicial
temperament necessarily reflect the values and beliefs that he has
acquired throughout the course of his life. To understand the equal
protection philosophy underpinning Thomas’s conservative ideology,
one must examine the values Thomas learned from his grandfather
45
during his upbringing in Savannah, Georgia, as well as Thomas’s
own experiences with affirmative action.
A. Callused Justice: Lessons from an Iron-Willed Man
46

Thomas was born in the “tiny” Georgia town of Pinpoint, where
he lived in his aunt’s “ramshackle house” with no running water and
47
basically no electricity for the first few years of his life. But Thomas
was mostly raised by his maternal grandparents in Savannah, where
he and his brother were sent to live after his brother burned down his
48
aunt’s home and his mother was no longer able to support them.
As an African American growing up in Savannah in the 1950s
and 1960s, Thomas was a frequent victim of racism. “Many parts of

. . . To paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, “we have nothing to offer, but blood,
toil, tears, and sweat.” There is, today, no popular market for these, though they are
just as necessary now to take advantage of freedom today as they were in Churchill’s
day to secure freedom.
Clarence Thomas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Freedom: A Responsibility, Not a Right,
Kormendy Lecture Before the Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law (Apr. 7, 1994),
in 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 5, 8–11 (1994); see also MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 280
(“As Thomas sees it, there is no way for the nation to compensate for the sins of the
past . . . . The best the nation can do from here on out is to play fair, even if it never has been
before.”).
Moreover, Thomas will not amend his position to reach a more favorable result for a
sympathetic plaintiff. Merida and Fletcher have observed:
Thomas says his actions are defined by the Constitution and the text of laws he is
called on to interpret, not by how he feels about the plight of a plaintiff or a particular
public policy issue. . . . [H]e finds the contemporary context of society all but
irrelevant. Instead . . . he relies on the original intent of the founders. . . . Sometimes,
Thomas explains, [consistency] puts helping someone in need or righting an obvious
wrong beyond his reach.
Id. at 250.
44. See generally ROSEN, supra note 3 (discussing judicial character and temperament).
45. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 6–8.
46. Id. at 1.
47. Id. at 1–4. According to Thomas, life in Pinpoint was “a daily struggle for the barest of
essentials.” Id. at 3–4. The town was so poor that “when you got sick, you stayed that way, and
often you died of it.” Id.
48. Id. at 6–8.
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49

Savannah . . . clung fiercely to racial segregation,” forcing Thomas to
50
live in fear as part of a subject class. Thomas learned to persevere,
despite the racism he encountered, because of the influence of his
51
52
grandfather, who was frugal, self-disciplined, and severe. Thomas’s
grandfather ruled with an “iron will,” “control[ling] every aspect” of
53
Thomas’s life. In place of warmth and praise, he used insults and
intimidation to teach Thomas the value of hard work, responsibility,
and diligence:
“I could do more with a teaspoon than you can do with a shovel,” he
snapped whenever we were shoveling dirt. “You[’re] worth less than
a carload of dead men.” He never praised us, just as he never
hugged us. Whenever my grandmother urged him to tell us that we
had done a good job, he replied, “That’s their responsibility. Any
54
job worth doing is worth doing right.”

As a result, Thomas came to appreciate the importance of
emotional strength and physical resilience. Using “hard-earned
calluses” as a metaphor for life, Thomas has suggested that suffering
is sometimes necessary to overcome one’s weaknesses and diminish
future pain:
Our small, soft hands blistered quickly at the start of each summer,
but Daddy never let us wear work gloves, which he considered a sign
of weakness. After a few weeks of constant work, the bloody blisters
gave way to hard-earned calluses that protected us from pain. Long

49. Id. at 21.
50. See id. at 21–22 (“The Ku Klux Klan held a convention [in Savannah] in 1960, and 250
of its white-robed members paraded down the city’s main street one Saturday afternoon. No
matter how curious you might be about the way white people lived, you didn’t go where you
didn’t belong. That was a recipe for jail, or worse.”).
51. Thomas’s grandfather was the only father figure in his life, as his biological father
abandoned Thomas when he was an infant. Id. at 1–2.
52. See id. at 13 (“Daddy made it plain, though, that there was a connection between what
he provided for us and what he required of us. He told us that if we learned how to work, we
would be able to live as well as he and [my grandmother] did when we grew up.”); see also
MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 79 (“[H]e taught himself plumbing, bricklaying,
carpentry.”). For example, Thomas’s grandfather would insist that Thomas bathe in a “teaspoon
of water,” wash his body with “laundry detergent instead of soap,” and dry his body with a
washcloth instead of a towel. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 17. If Thomas’s grandfather was not
satisfied with how clean Thomas got himself, “he finished the job himself, a terrifying
experience that [Thomas] did everything [he] could to avoid.” Id. at 17.
53. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 12.
54. Id. at 25–26.
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after the fact, it occurred to me that this was a metaphor for life—
55
blisters come before calluses, vulnerability before maturity . . . .

This metaphor is consistent with Thomas’s general philosophy that
coddling and overprotection can only breed dependency,
undermining the development of other values that are necessary to
56
succeed. This philosophy is particularly apparent in Thomas’s equal
protection jurisprudence. Thomas believes that “conscious and
57
unconscious prejudice persists in our society,” and that African
58
Americans must “gird themselves for that reality.” Laws that
“distribute benefits on the basis of race” cannot “make us equal,”
Thomas explains; they “may cause [minorities] to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to
59
preferences.”
Thomas’s grandfather also helped shape Thomas’s opposition to
affirmative action by instilling in Thomas an aversion to paternalistic
treatment on account of his race. In his memoirs, Thomas uses a
lesson from his grandfather to draw a distinction between outright
bigots and those who “mask[] their contempt with elaborate displays
of kindness, sympathy, or compassion”:
The contrast reminded me of Daddy’s explanation of the difference
between rattlesnakes and water moccasins. Both, he said, were
deadly, but the rattlesnake was easier to spot. It rattled before it
struck, while the water moccasin would strike silently without
60
warning, making it more dangerous.

Like segregation and outright bigotry, Thomas argues, affirmative
61
action stamps African Americans with a “badge of inferiority.” He
55. Id. at 25.
56. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
57. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
58. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 276.
59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 46. This comparison is strangely reminiscent of the one
shared by Thurgood Marshall upon his retirement in 1990. When Justice Marshall stepped down
from the Court, he was asked if President Bush should appoint an African American to replace
him. With Thomas in mind, Marshall warned against “picking the wrong kind of negro” based
on race alone, saying: “My dad told me way back . . . that there’s no difference between a white
snake and a black snake. They both bite.” EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 449 (1999)
(quoting Thurgood Marshall).
61. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241; see also THOMAS, supra note 2, at 56–57 (“It seemed to me
that the dependency [affirmative action] fostered might ultimately prove as diabolical as
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argues that proponents of affirmative action are even more dangerous
than segregationists and outright bigots because they hide their
contempt behind gestures of apparent kindness:
At least southerners were up front about their bigotry: you knew
exactly where they were coming from, just like the Georgia
rattlesnakes . . . . Not so the paternalistic big-city whites who offered
you a helping hand so long as you were careful to agree with
them . . . . Like the water moccasin they struck without
62
warning . . . .

Likewise, Thomas argues, affirmative action is potentially more
destructive than segregation because it represents “a new kind of
enslavement,” which “ultimately relie[s] on the generosity—and the
63
ever changing self-interests—of politicians and activists.”
B. The Scars of Affirmative Action
Thomas’s own experiences with affirmative action also greatly
influenced his conservative judicial philosophy. During college,
Thomas began to question the assumption of affirmative action
programs that “all blacks [are] equally disadvantaged by virtue of
64
their race alone,” regardless of socioeconomic status. Likewise,
Thomas grew highly skeptical of any social science theory that
grouped all African Americans together, arguing that such theories
65
inherently suggested “that blacks could never catch up to whites.”

segregation, permanently condemning poor people to the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic
ladder by cannibalizing the values without which they had no long-term hope of improving their
lot.”).
62. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 75–76.
63. Id. at 56.
64. Id. (“Talented blacks stuck on the bottom rung of the socioeconomic ladder clearly
deserved such help, but the ones who most often took advantage of it were considerably higher
up on the ladder. Most of the middle-class blacks with whom I discussed these policies argued
that all blacks were equally disadvantaged by virtue of their race alone. I thought that was
nonsense. . . . I also thought the same policies should be applied to similarly disadvantaged
whites.”).
65. Id. at 80. Thomas’s jurisprudence on the Court has reflected this skepticism. Thomas
has founded his equal protection philosophy on the belief that “individuals should be treated as
individuals, not as members of racial or ethnic groups.” GERBER, supra note 8, at 109. This
belief is also evident in his commitment to individual rights, id. at 52, and his skepticism toward
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which he believes objectionably presupposes that all members of
a particular minority group will vote in a bloc, id. at 87. Indeed, Thomas first quoted Harlan’s
conception of a colorblind Constitution in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
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Perhaps because of his experiences with affirmative action, Thomas
developed an aversion to group affiliations, refusing to be placed in a
66
box based on his immutable traits. Indeed, Thomas has drawn on his
own experiences with affirmative action to demonstrate the
debilitating effects of special treatment on account of race:
As much as it stung to be told that I’d done well in the seminary
despite my race, it was far worse to feel that I was now at Yale
because of it. I sought to vanquish the perception that I was
somehow inferior to my white classmates . . . . But it was futile for
me to suppose that I could escape the stigmatizing effects of racial
preference, and I began to fear that it would be used forever after to
67
discount my achievements.

Ultimately, Thomas’s skepticism of “preferential policies” that
group all African Americans together to “help [them] adjust to life
after segregation,” led Thomas toward conservative politics and a
68
narrow reading of the Constitution. In fact, Thomas claims that he
first aligned himself with the Republican Party because of Ronald
Reagan’s promise “to get government off our backs and out of our
lives,” which Thomas greatly preferred to the “Democratic Party’s
ceaseless promise to legislate the problems of blacks out of
69
existence.”
Legislative schemes designed to favor African
Americans, Thomas believed, would only promote a culture of
dependency and submission, silently undermining the values
70
necessary for African Americans to progress in society. This belief
would shape his jurisprudence on the Court, as his distrust of
government interference matured into a strict, originalist ideology

concurring in the judgment), to vilify what he considered a presumption of the liberal reading of
the Voting Rights Act: that all members of a race “think alike,” id.
66. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 366 (“[Thomas] seems obsessively wary of
racial traps, worried that he will be put in a box reserved solely for black skin. And that’s an
intolerable thought for a man who sees boxes as anathema. So whatever racial pride Thomas
feels is overshadowed by this greater need not to be typecast, which is a synonym for limited,
which is a synonym for inferior.”).
67. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 75.
68. Id. at 56.
69. Id. at 130.
70. Id. “I thought that blacks would be better off if they were left alone [by the
government],” Thomas explained, “instead of being used as guinea pigs for the foolish schemes
of dream-killing politicians and their ideological acolytes.” Id.
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ostensibly designed to prevent the powered from manipulating the
71
Constitution in a way that could persecute minorities.
II. HIGHER-LAW FOUNDATION
To promote his own racial philosophy, Thomas has embraced a
conservative jurisprudential ideology strictly based on the founders’
72
original intent and the Constitution’s original meaning. Initially,
however, Thomas was uncomfortable with the idea of endorsing an
73
ideology that had tolerated slavery and segregation. Before his
ideology could be consistent with his desire for racial equality,
Thomas needed to reconcile his racial philosophy with the reality that
the founders and the pre-Reconstruction Constitution tolerated, if not
74
expressly endorsed, the institution of slavery. Thomas found the
answer in the natural law principles that Harlan and other scholars
75
embraced at the turn of the twentieth century.
Harlan, like many other nineteenth-century scholars, believed
that the founders and the American people were uniquely chosen by
God and that everything that happened in America was meant to
76
fulfill a divine plan. Harlan’s assumption that “God had established
77
a moral foundation for law” allowed Harlan to confidently declare

71. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 257 (“While Thomas is no advocate for
affirmative action, he believes that racism is alive and inescapable. But he feels the government
is ill equipped to deal with the reality or to address the legacy of discrimination. The best thing
that blacks and other minorities can do, therefore, to improve their circumstance is to become
self-sufficient.”). Thomas recalls how a college friend once asked, “Clarence, as a member of a
group that has been treated shabbily by the majority in this country, why would you want to give
the government more power over your personal life?” THOMAS, supra note 2, at 73. The point
apparently resonated with Thomas, as he explained: “[R]eal freedom mean[s] independence
from government intrusion, which in turn mean[s] that you ha[ve] to take responsibility for your
own decisions. When the government assumes that responsibility, it takes away your freedom—
and wasn’t freedom the very thing for which blacks in America were fighting?” Id.
72. See KEN FORKETT, JUDGING THOMAS 190 (2004) (describing Thomas’s adoption of the
natural law principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence).
73. See id. (“To interpret the Constitution literally, to rely on the intentions of the framers
was to accept the notion that black Americans were never intended to have equal rights and
freedoms.”); cf., e.g., THOMAS, supra note 2, at 88 (describing his discomfort about working for
a Republican).
74. FORKETT, supra note 72, at 190.
75. Id. at 191.
76. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 16, at 49.
77. Id.
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that his lonely dissents were not only correct, but also inevitable.
This assumption also informed Harlan’s belief that the Civil War was
79
necessary to fulfill the promises of the Declaration of Independence.
Harlan believed that the Declaration of Independence, which he
referred to as “our political bible,” was the original founding
document, representing a truer expression of the founders’ wishes
80
than the Constitution. For Harlan, the Reconstruction amendments
constitutionalized the universal equality that the founders promised
81
in the Declaration of Independence.
Harlan’s natural law principles offered Thomas an intriguing way
to reconcile his commitment to equality with his originalist ideology.
Through natural law, Thomas could simply denounce the institution
of slavery as repugnant to the founders’ words and principles:
I led my staffers . . . in discussions of the natural-law philosophy with
which the Declaration of Independence, America’s first founding
document, is permeated. “All men are created equal,” Thomas
Jefferson had written in 1776. “They are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights.” That’s natural law in a nutshell: if
all men are created equal, then no man can own another man, and
we can only be governed by our consent. How, then, could a country
founded on those principles have permitted slavery and segregation
to exist? The answer was that it couldn’t—not without being untrue
82
to its own ideals.

To infuse natural law principles into his own ideology, Thomas
embraced a form of originalism that is rooted in the principles of the
83
founders rather than solely the practices of the founders. This brand

78. See id. at 51 (“Perhaps this faith was what allowed Harlan to joke about his dissents;
not only did he know that he was right, but also he knew that right was unchanging and would
prevail eventually.”).
79. See id. at 62–64 (“In order for all Americans to claim civil rights, the Civil War had to
be fought and the slaves freed. Far from disrupting the course of American history, these events
fulfilled the country’s providential mission. The emancipation of blacks answered the wish of
the founders.”).
80. Id. at 64 (quoting John Marshall Harlan, Remarks at the Unveiling of Memorial
Tablets of Former Presidents of Centre College (June 19, 1891)).
81. Id. at 49.
82. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 188.
83. See GERBER, supra note 8, at 103–04 (describing this approach as “liberal,” as opposed
to “conservative,” originalism); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 791 (1996) (critiquing both liberals’ and conservatives’ interpretations of the
Reconstruction amendments). For further elaboration on the differences between “liberal” and

2008]

THE NEXT “GREAT DISSENTER”?

153

of originalism allowed Thomas to use the principles that the founders
expressed in the Declaration of Independence to color the meaning of
84
the founders’ words in the Constitution. Thus, Thomas was able to
adopt a natural law philosophy reminiscent of that to which Harlan
and other nineteenth-century scholars subscribed.
Like Harlan, Thomas views the Declaration of Independence as
a truer expression of the framers’ ideals—ideals that were finally
realized when the Reconstruction amendments were added to the
85
Constitution following the Civil War. Accordingly, Thomas believes
that the Reconstruction amendments injected into the Constitution
the innate right to equality that the founders promised in the
86
Declaration of Independence. In doing so, Thomas argues, the
Reconstruction amendments purged the Constitution of the taint of
87
slavery, rendering the Constitution colorblind.
Thomas has also praised Harlan’s understanding of the “‘higher
88
law’ background of the Constitution.” He appears to share Harlan’s
89
belief that there is a divine foundation for the law. Like Harlan,
90
Thomas is a deeply religious individual. His belief in higher law may,
as it did for Harlan, bolster Thomas’s confidence in the correctness
and inevitability of his own separate opinions.

“conservative” originalism, see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1–8 (1995).
84. GERBER, supra note 8, at 103–04; John C. Eastman, Taking Justice Thomas Seriously, 2
GREEN BAG 2D 425, 426 (1999) (book review) (“[I]t is a jurisprudence rooted in the self-evident
truths of human nature and the inalienable rights derived from that nature, as articulated in the
Declaration of Independence.”).
85. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 994 (“The original Constitution’s guarantee clause, read in
light of the Declaration of Independence, points in the direction of abolition . . . . The proper
way to interpret the Civil War amendments is as extensions of the promise of the original
Constitution which in turn was intended to fulfill the promise of the Declaration.”).
86. Id.
87. See id. at 995 (“[T]oo many of us today ignore . . . Harlan’s splendid exegesis of the
‘original intention’ of the Civil War amendments . . . . The first principles of equality and
liberty . . . . could lead us above petty squabbling over ‘quotas,’ ‘affirmative action,’ and raceconscious remedies for social ills.”).
88. Id. at 993.
89. See, e.g., id. at 995 (linking natural law with the “laws of nature and of nature’s God”
referred to in the Declaration of Independence).
90. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 335–38 (describing the “central role of
religion in [Thomas’s] life”).
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Thomas has used natural law to both affirm and legitimate his
conservative ideology. Natural law represents “the perfect expression
of [Thomas’s] desire to transcend his concerns for race and civil
rights,” allowing Thomas to both “preserve[] his care for the fate of
Black Americans” and “speak intelligently and in a principled fashion
91
about politics and society in general.” Moreover, as Part III
demonstrates, it has offered Thomas a way to glorify his fight for his
own racial philosophy.
III. HARLAN’S COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION
Whereas the natural law principles Thomas borrowed from
Harlan and other nineteenth-century scholars have allowed Thomas
to legitimate his racial philosophy, Harlan’s dissent in Plessy has
provided Thomas the ammunition to fight for it. In Thomas’s quest
for racial equality, Harlan’s colorblind Constitution has become his
rallying cry.
A. Harlan’s Dissent in Plessy
Plessy examined whether a Louisiana statute that required
railroad companies to segregate passengers on account of their race
92
into separate but equal seating accommodations was constitutional.
An eight-judge majority upheld the statute, reasoning that, so long as
the accommodations are equal, racial segregation does not offend the
93
Fourteenth Amendment. The majority dismissed the argument that
the “enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority,” emphasizing the facial neutrality of the
94
act. If the enforced separation did produce a feeling of inferiority,
the majority assured, “it [was] not by reason of anything found in the

91. Ken Masugi, Natural Right and Oversight: The Use and Abuse of “Natural Law” in the
Clarence Thomas Hearings, 9 POL. COMM. 231, 232–33 (1992).
92. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
93. Id. at 544. Although “the object of the [Fourteenth Amendment] was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,” the majority explained, “it could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either.” Id.
94. Id. at 551.
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act, but solely because the colored race [had chosen] to put that
95
construction upon it.”
In his lonely dissent, Harlan interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment much more expansively than the majority. According to
Harlan, the Fourteenth Amendment includes in it not only “the right
to exemption from unfriendly legislation against [African Americans]
distinctively as colored,” but also the right to “exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society . . . which are steps
96
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.” Harlan
refused to ignore the clear discriminatory purpose behind the
97
Louisiana statute’s neutral guise. Because Louisiana intended to
reduce African Americans to “the condition of a subject race,” the
98
statute offended the Fourteenth Amendment.
Harlan’s dissent views the Fourteenth Amendment as a
necessary shield to protect African Americans from laws intended to
subordinate them. It was in this vein that Harlan incorporated his
conception of a colorblind Constitution:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it
remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
99
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.

The rhetorical force of the last sentence, standing alone, may
undercut the larger point that Harlan was trying to make. The
sentence follows logically from Harlan’s discussion of a “superior,
dominant, ruling class,” and even designates “classes among citizens”
as the evil that Harlan’s “color-blind” Constitution “neither knows

95. Id.
96. Id. at 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 557 (“Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to
exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”).
98. Id. at 556; accord id. at 560 (condemning the statute’s “real meaning”: that “colored
citizens are so inferior . . . that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens”).
99. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
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100

nor tolerates.” In context, the sentence does not necessarily suggest
that every classification on account of race would be unconstitutional.
Rather, it appears to speak only to racial classifications intended to
101
render one race subordinate to another.
Thus, in applying Harlan’s “color-blind” language to a
contemporary racial classification, perhaps the debate should be over
whether the classification in question was intended to and does
render one race subordinate to another rather than whether the
classification was made on account of race.
Regardless of what Harlan originally meant when he declared
the Constitution “color-blind,” however, Harlan’s language has
become the rallying cry for those who argue that all classifications on
the basis of race, whether malicious or benign, are equally offensive
102
to the Constitution. And Thomas has emerged on the Court as the
most vocal proponent of this interpretation of a colorblind
Constitution.

100. Id.
101. For a general discussion of the differences between the antisubordination and
anticlassification approaches to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, see Reva B. Siegel,
Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
102. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355–56 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (using Harlan’s language to
summarize the anticlassification approach). In Bakke, proponents of the antisubordination
approach abandoned Harlan’s colorblind language. Writing on behalf of himself and three other
Justices, Justice Brennan pronounced:
The assertion of human equality is closely associated with the proposition that
differences in color or creed, birth or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the
way in which persons should be treated. Nonetheless, the position that such factors
must be “constitutionally an irrelevance,” summed up by the shorthand phrase “[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind,” has never been adopted by this Court as the proper
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, we have expressly rejected this
proposition on a number of occasions.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
Those who view the Fourteenth Amendment as an antisubordination doctrine generally
disfavor the anticlassification approach associated with Harlan’s colorblind language. See, e.g.,
Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 106 (2000) (“Because color
blindness discourse defines ‘discrimination on the basis of race’ in highly specialized ways—as a
practice of group-categorical differentiation that serves no instrumentally relevant end—color
blindness discourse can both discredit and rationalize practices that perpetuate racial
stratification.”).
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B. Thomas’s Colorblind Constitution
Thomas was not the first Justice to quote Harlan’s colorblind
rhetoric, nor was he the first Justice to argue that all classifications
made on the basis of race, including those intended to benefit
103
The legality of
minorities, require the strictest of scrutiny.
104
affirmative action was fiercely debated from the start, and the
dispute over what standard should be used to evaluate affirmative
action programs was already heated by the time Thomas joined the
105
Court.
In many ways, however, Thomas has appropriated Harlan’s
colorblind Constitution, embracing not only Harlan’s words, but also
what Thomas portrays to be Harlan’s underlying principles. To fully
appreciate the genius of Harlan’s dissent, Thomas argues, Harlan’s
words must be read in light of Harlan’s belief in “the ‘higher law’
106
background of the Constitution.” Harlan understood that “the
Founders’ constitutional principles lay at the heart of the segregation
107
issue,” and that understanding, according to Thomas, was central to
108
Harlan’s invocation of a colorblind Constitution. Thus, Thomas has
read Harlan’s colorblind Constitution to include not only Harlan’s

103. Cf., e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219–22 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing against special treatment for minority applicants on the grounds that such
treatment constitutes impermissible race discrimination under Title VII).
104. See id. The first case that the Court heard on the constitutionality of affirmative action
was DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam) (5–4 decision), although the Court
ultimately dismissed the case on procedural grounds. In DeFunis, the plaintiff, a white male,
claimed that the University of Washington Law School’s affirmative action program denied him
admission on account of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 314; see also
id. at 320–22 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the law school’s program). The issue was hotly
debated at the time, as several Justices noted in their dissents. See id. at 320 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“[B]ecause of the significance of the issues raised . . . it is important to reach the
merits.”); id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional issues which are avoided today
concern vast numbers of people, organizations, and colleges and universities, as evidenced by
the filing of twenty-six amicus curiae briefs. Few constitutional questions in recent history have
stirred as much debate, and they will not disappear.”).
105. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (requiring only intermediate
scrutiny for federal affirmative action programs), and Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
564 (1990) (same), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–27
(1995), with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(advocating strict scrutiny for state and local affirmative action programs).
106. Thomas, supra note 8, at 993.
107. Id. at 990.
108. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is
color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”).
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rhetoric but also his own interpretation of Harlan’s natural law
principles—the very principles that Thomas has embraced to justify
109
his conservative ideology. Armed with his own construction of
Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, Thomas has taken aim at the one
case most often associated with racial equality: Brown v. Board of
Education.
C. Redefining Brown and the Modern Era of Equal Protection
Jurisprudence
The eloquence of Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, along with Harlan’s
110
prediction that history would judge Plessy’s holding unfavorably,
rendered the dissent something of a war cry for the pre-Brown civil
rights movement. Fifty years after Plessy was decided, for example,
Harlan’s dissent “became a kind of bible” for Thurgood Marshall,

109. See discussion supra Part II. Although Thomas has used Harlan’s words and ideas to
reconcile inconsistencies in his own ideology, Thomas has conveniently ignored the parts of
Harlan’s character and jurisprudence that would undermine Thomas’s construction of a
colorblind Constitution. One such aspect of Harlan’s character is Harlan’s paternalistic attitude
toward civil rights. See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 16, at 18 (attributing Harlan’s “demand for
the legal equality of blacks” to his paternalistic “sense of white obligation to black
dependents”). Despite Harlan’s civil rights advocacy on the Court, he was nonetheless a slave
owner until the Civil War. Id. at 26–27. The Harlan family supported gradual emancipation (as
opposed to abrupt abolition), viewing slavery as “a form of social welfare,” id. at 20, 22, in which
Caucasians and African Americans “liv[ed] in stratified yet mutually devoted company,”
because of “a sense of white obligation to black dependents,” id. at 18. Harlan’s treatment of
“gifted slave[s],” to whom he offered freedom, confirms this perspective. See id. at 23 (implying
that Harlan felt average slaves were not competent to live as freemen). It is a perspective that
unquestionably assumes that the races are fundamentally different—an assumption that Harlan
continued to rely on during his tenure on the Court and even expressed in his dissent in Plessy:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Yet, as Section C demonstrates, one of Thomas’s
principal arguments for a colorblind Constitution is that racially preferential treatment is
patronizing and paternalistic, implying that African Americans are inherently inferior to
Caucasians. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“There can be no doubt that the
paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this [racial set-aside] program is at war with the
principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution.”). It is ironic that
Thomas has chosen to borrow much of his civil rights approach from a Justice who, in a region
filled with rattlesnakes, was the quintessential water moccasin. See supra notes 60–62 and
accompanying text.
110. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion, the judgment this
day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal
in the Dred Scott case.”).
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who “liked to read it aloud for inspiration as he prepared to argue
111
Brown v. Board of Education.”
112
however, the short,
When Brown was decided in 1954,
unanimous decision did not fully vindicate Harlan’s “color-blind”
Constitution. Brown held that state laws requiring racially segregated
schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
113
Amendment, expressly overruling Plessy in the field of public
114
education. The Brown Court did not, however, specifically quote or
cite Harlan’s dissent, leaving it unclear which elements of the dissent,
if any, had actually influenced the Court’s reasoning.
Furthermore, the Court’s holding in Brown was much narrower
than Harlan’s argument in Plessy. Neither the text nor the reasoning
of Brown appears to overrule the “separate but equal” doctrine
outside the context of education. Rather, Brown relied on social
science research specific to the field of public education to conclude
that “[t]o separate [African-American children] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
115
of inferiority as to their status in the community.” Likewise, the
decision focused on the “importance of education to our democratic
116
society,” and the Court’s holding was narrowly circumscribed to
that end. The Court held that “in the field of public education, the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational
117
facilities are inherently unequal.” Thus, although Brown secured
118
Harlan’s legacy as a great and prophetic dissenter, the decision left
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy unsatisfied.
Despite the education-specific nature of Brown, the Court
subsequently used the decision, without further explanation, to strike
119
down state laws mandating segregation of other public facilities. In

111. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 125–26.
112. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113. Id. at 495; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (prohibiting the federal
government from maintaining racially segregated schools on the grounds that such federal
action violates the “due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment”).
114. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (“Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this
[holding] is rejected.”).
115. Id. at 494.
116. Id. at 493.
117. Id. at 495 (emphases added).
118. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
119. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courtroom seating);
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (public restaurants); Gayle v.
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doing so, the Court interpreted Brown to stand for the principle that
all separate facilities are inherently unequal, overruling Plessy
120
entirely and “usher[ing] in the modern era of equal protection
121
jurisprudence.”
Because the Court never explained why segregation outside the
field of public education was unconstitutional, however, the Court left
the meaning of Brown, and thus the rationale for the modern era of
equal protection jurisprudence, both unclear and “uniquely
122
malleable.” Once it became necessary to sculpt the contours of
equal protection, Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, which did articulate a
rationale for why all government-enforced segregation is
123
unconstitutional, became an ironic source of ammunition against
the antisubordination approach. This Section argues that Thomas has
capitalized on Brown’s malleability, using his own equal protection
philosophy and Harlan’s colorblind rhetoric to redefine the rationale
for the modern era of equal protection jurisprudence.
1. Brown’s “Great Flaw.” In 1987, three years before his
nomination to the Court, Thomas published an article in the Howard
Law Journal calling Brown and all of its progeny a “missed
124
opportunity.” Brown’s “great flaw,” Thomas argued, “is that it did
125
not rely on Harlan’s dissent in Plessy,” which correctly called for a
126
“color-blind” Constitution. This misstep, Thomas suggested, not

Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (municipal bus system); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf course); Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S.
877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches, bathhouses, and swimming pools).
120. See KULL, supra note 14, at 161–62 (describing the Court’s unexplained extension of
Brown to proscribe all de jure segregation).
121. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 617. Prior to Brown, the Court had interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause very narrowly, limiting the clause’s scope to bar discrimination only
against African Americans. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872)
(“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination
against [African Americans] as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision.”).
122. KULL, supra note 14, at 162.
123. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
124. Thomas, supra note 8, at 991.
125. Id. at 990.
126. See id. at 992 (arguing that “Justice Harlan’s Plessy opinion is a good example of
thinking in the spirit of the founding” but “[l]argely as a result of the dubious reasoning of the
post-Plessy Court, and a national indifference to the rights of all Americans, Justice Harlan’s
argument that the Constitution is ‘color-blind’ did not rally supporters”).
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only abandoned the founders’ constitutional principle, it also
opened the door for a new generation of racial subordination in the
128
form of affirmative action. Thomas claimed that had the Brown
Court embraced Harlan’s conception of a colorblind Constitution,
instead of relying on social science, Brown could have represented
“reason rather than sentiment,” “justice rather than sensitivity,” and
129
“freedom rather than dependence.”
To correct this “cynical
130
rejection of ‘the laws of nature and of nature’s God,’” Thomas
argued, the Court must mend the errors of the Brown Court, and
replace “the Warren opinion” with the spirit of Harlan’s incisive
131
dissent.
2. Mending the Errors of the Brown Court. In his confirmation
hearing, Thomas dismissed his prior criticism of Brown and its
132
progeny as the ponderings of “a part-time political theorist.” His
previous theorizing, however, proved indicative of his subsequent
civil rights jurisprudence. During his first sixteen terms on the Court,
Thomas has attempted to remedy Brown’s “great flaw,” writing
passionate separate opinions that reject the parts of Brown he
disagrees with in favor of his own beliefs about what the Brown Court
should have held. In the process, Thomas has gradually aligned
Harlan’s colorblind rhetoric with his own equal protection
philosophy.
133
In Missouri v. Jenkins, Thomas became the first Supreme Court
134
Justice to openly criticize the reasoning of Brown. Although

127. Thomas contended that
[t]he Brown psychology makes the legal and social environment all-controlling: “the
feeling of inferiority” or “the sense of inferiority” is the problem. . . . Thus, the Brown
focus on environment overlooks the real problem with segregation, its origin in
slavery, which was at fundamental odds with the founding principles.
Id. at 991.
128. See id. at 995 (“The first principles of equality and liberty should inspire our political
and constitutional thinking. It could lead us above petty squabbling over ‘quotas,’ ‘affirmative
action,’ and race-conscious remedies for social ills.”).
129. Id. at 991.
130. Id. at 995 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)).
131. Id. at 991–92.
132. GERBER, supra note 8, at 52–53 (citing Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 237 (1991) (statement of Clarence Thomas)).
133. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
134. GERBER, supra note 8, at 79.
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Thomas agreed with the majority that a district court could not order
an interdistrict remedy to promote integration unless all of the
districts involved had participated in the constitutional violation,
Thomas wrote a concurring opinion denouncing Brown’s use of social
science research as a distraction from the larger principles that Brown
135
was meant to represent. Brown, Thomas claimed, “did not need to
rely upon any psychological or social-science research to announce
the simple, yet fundamental, truth that the government cannot
136
discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race.”
While disparaging Brown’s use of social science research,
however, Thomas mostly directed his criticism at the ways in which
Brown has been interpreted. For example, Thomas criticized the
district court’s reliance on social science research, attributing the
court’s reliance to a misreading of Brown:
Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have caused
psychological feelings of inferiority. . . . Psychological injury or
benefit is irrelevant to the question of whether state actors have
engaged in intentional discrimination—the critical inquiry for
137
ascertaining violations of the Equal Protection Clause.

Thomas also took issue with the district court’s finding that
138
“racial imbalances . . . inflict harm on black students,” denouncing
the court’s assumption that “anything that is predominantly black
139
must be inferior.” To Thomas, the district court’s position appeared
to rest on the idea that “blacks cannot succeed without the benefit of
140
the company of whites.” Thomas used the court’s assumption to
condemn the “notion of Black inferiority that Brown had come to
141
represent.”
In directing the majority of his criticism at the district court’s
interpretation of Brown, instead of at Brown itself, Thomas was able
to disparage the parts of Brown he disagrees with while reading his
own principles into Brown’s ever-malleable shell:

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 120.
Id. at 119–21.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 119.
GERBER, supra note 8, at 79.
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As the Court’s unanimous opinion [in Brown] indicated: “[I]n the
field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” At the
heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the
principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals, and
not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. It is for this
reason that we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of
142
scrutiny, which . . . has [almost always] proven automatically fatal.

Thus, in Jenkins, Thomas read Brown to mean that the Equal
Protection Clause categorically forbids the government from treating
individuals “as members of racial . . . groups” unless the “strictest of
143
scrutiny” proves it necessary. This reading of Brown would soon
become the law.
144
That same day, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Thomas
cast the crucial fifth vote to hold that all government classifications on
the basis of race, whether invidious or benign, must be reviewed
145
under strict scrutiny. In doing so, the Court overruled Metro
146
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, which, five years earlier, had held that
federal affirmative action programs only required intermediate
147
scrutiny.
In his separate opinion, Thomas came one step closer to uniting
his own equal protection philosophy with Harlan’s colorblind
rhetoric. “There can be no doubt,” Thomas insisted, “that the
paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this [racial set-aside]
program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that
148
underlies and infuses our Constitution.” To support this assertion,

142. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120–21 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
143. Id.
144. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
145. Id. at 227 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although
Adarand was the first case to hold that strict scrutiny applies to federal affirmative action
programs, id., the Court had previously held that strict scrutiny applies to state and local
affirmative action programs, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490–91 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
146. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226–
27.
147. Id. at 564–65; see also TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE
FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE 127 (1997) (describing how Thomas, in replacing Marshall, joined
the four dissenting Justices from Metro Broadcasting to overturn the precedent).
148. Adarand, 515 U.S at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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Thomas cited the words of the Declaration of Independence. In
doing so, Thomas relied on the natural law principles that inspired his
150
interpretation of Harlan’s colorblind Constitution.
151
Eight years later, in Grutter v. Bollinger, Thomas relied on
Harlan’s colorblind rhetoric directly to make the same general
152
point. Arguing that the University of Michigan’s affirmative action
program failed strict scrutiny because the state’s interest in a diverse
student body could not be considered compelling, Thomas reiterated
his belief that racial classifications intended to benefit minorities are
153
just as offensive as those intended to burden minorities. Thomas
concluded his thirty-page separate opinion with a nod toward both
the Declaration of Independence and Harlan’s colorblind
Constitution: “For the immediate future,” Thomas wrote, “the
majority has placed its imprimatur on [affirmative action,] a practice
that can only weaken the principle of equality embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause. ‘Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
154
among citizens.’”
Thus, Thomas read his own opposition to
affirmative action into Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, aligning his
own natural rights principles with those of Harlan.
In 2007, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
155
School District No. 1,
Thomas broadcast Harlan’s colorblind
rhetoric with a renewed intensity, practically reading Harlan’s words
directly into the meaning of Brown. Although Thomas joined the

149. Id. (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
2 (U.S. 1776))).
150. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
151. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
152. Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Thomas argued that
[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those
classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also
because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race
relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. “Purchased at the
price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our
Nation’s understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact
on the individual and our society.”
Id. at 353 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment)).
154. Id. at 378 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
155. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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opinion of the Court, he wrote separately to address additional points
156
raised by the dissent. In contrast to the dissenting Justices, who
Thomas suggested “[d]isfavor[ed] a colorblind interpretation of the
157
Constitution,”
Thomas wholeheartedly endorsed Harlan’s
colorblind words:
Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its
rejection of the color-blind Constitution. The dissent attempts to
marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution by consigning it
to me and Members of today’s plurality. But I am quite comfortable
in the company I keep. My view of the Constitution is Justice
Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” And my view
158
was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown.

This quote illustrates how Thomas has entirely equated his own equal
protection philosophy with the sentiment Harlan expressed when he
declared the Constitution “color-blind.” His view of the Constitution,
Thomas insists, is Harlan’s colorblind Constitution.
Additionally, this quote demonstrates the utility of Harlan’s
words. Although Thomas has mostly employed Harlan’s words to
fight for his own equal protection philosophy, he has also reached for
Harlan’s words to shield himself from the counterassaults of his
ideological opponents. In rejecting Harlan’s colorblind Constitution,
Thomas appeared to suggest, the dissenters were directly assaulting
not only Harlan’s dissent in Plessy but also the views of civil rights
icon Thurgood Marshall and, by association, the meaning of Brown.
Moreover, Thomas argued, the dissenters in Parents Involved were
159
using the very arguments endorsed by the segregationists to do so.

156. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote this dissent, which Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2782 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
159. Thomas wrote:
The dissent appears to pin its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to
current societal practice and expectations, deference to local officials, likely practical
consequences, and reliance on previous statements from this and other courts. Such a
view was ascendant in this Court’s jurisprudence for several decades. It first appeared
in Plessy . . . .
The segregationists in Brown embraced the arguments the Court endorsed in
Plessy. Though Brown decisively rejected those arguments, today’s dissent replicates
them to a distressing extent.
Id. at 2783–85.
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“What was wrong in 1954,” Thomas argued, “cannot be right
160
today.”
After Thomas aligned the dissenters with the segregationists of
Plessy and Brown and thus himself with the opponents of segregation
who righteously challenged the status quo, he turned to Harlan’s
colorblind rhetoric to sweep away whatever might remain of Brown’s
emphasis on social science:
Although no such distinction is apparent in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the dissent would constitutionalize today’s faddish
social theories that embrace that distinction. The Constitution is not
that malleable. Even if current social theories favor classroom racial
engineering as necessary to “solve the problems at hand,” the
161
Constitution enshrines principles independent of social theories.

To support his assertion that “the Constitution enshrines principles
independent of social theories,” Thomas cited the words of Harlan’s
162
dissent in Plessy, including Harlan’s colorblind language. Thus, in a
matter of pages, Thomas used Harlan’s words both to accuse the
dissenters of abandoning the sentiment of Brown and to berate the
dissenters for using a strategy that the Brown Court actually
163
employed.
Thomas concluded his concurrence with a final invocation of
Harlan’s colorblind Constitution: “The plans before us base school
assignment decisions on students’ race. Because ‘our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,’
164
such race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional.”

160. Id. at 2786.
161. Id. at 2787 (citation omitted).
162. Thomas quoted Justice Harlan:
“The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time . . . . But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. . . . Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
163. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
164. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S.
at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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Although, according to Thomas, “[t]he Constitution is not that
165
malleable,” Brown and its progeny have proven much easier to
166
manipulate. As best illustrated by Parents Involved in Community
Schools, Thomas has conclusively aligned himself with Harlan’s
colorblind Constitution, using the words of Harlan’s dissent in Plessy
to mold the very meaning of Brown into the shape of his own
167
jurisprudence. In doing so, Thomas has attempted to replace the
portions of Brown that he has long despised, particularly its reliance
on social science research, with his own ideas of what the landmark
decision should have held. Moreover, Thomas has attempted to do so
168
through a sentence that the Brown Court never explicitly embraced,
169
employed in a manner that Harlan may not have intended.
IV. OUTLIVING THE WATER MOCCASINS

170

In addition to Harlan’s natural rights principles and colorblind
Constitution, Thomas has also latched onto Harlan’s image as a great
and prophetic dissenter. For Thomas, Harlan represents the reality
that “[a] minority opinion on the court today can be a majority
171
opinion a generation from now.” This Part contends that Thomas
hopes that the ideas expressed in his separate opinions will outlive
those of his ideological opponents and secure his legacy as the next
172
great civil rights dissenter.
173

A. The Next “Mr. Civil Rights”?

If Thurgood Marshall bequeathed to Thomas his role as a great
174
champion of civil rights, Thomas has been a very ungracious heir.
Thomas has not just strayed from Marshall’s path—he has led the

165. Id. at 2787.
166. See supra text accompanying note 122.
167. See supra notes 153–64.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 112–18.
169. See supra notes 97–102, 109 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
171. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 250.
172. The term “dissenter” is used liberally here as most of Thomas’s civil rights opinions are
actually concurring opinions. See supra Part III.C.
173. See supra text accompanying note 31.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 27–34.
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175

charge to erase Marshall’s footsteps. To promote what he believes
to be in the best interest of African Americans, Thomas has
consistently opposed the use of race-conscious means to eradicate the
remnants of segregation, eroding many of the “hard-earned advances
176
[Marshall] had helped bring about.” His “every vote—even his
every public utterance, written or spoken—seems designed to outrage
177
the liberal establishment that so venerated Marshall.” As a result,
178
Thomas has been alienated by the African-American community,
179
dismissed as a sell-out, a traitor, and an “Uncle Tom.” As Thomas
himself explained, “These people are mad because I’m in Thurgood
180
Marshall’s seat.”
The contrast between Thomas and his renowned predecessor,
however, is merely one symbol of the larger reason many African
Americans begrudge him: Thomas is an African American who has
been given a rare opportunity to advance an African-American
agenda, and he has instead chosen to chart a judicial path that many
view as directly contrary to the interests of the African-American
181
community. Indeed, Thomas is perhaps most famous for his
passionate opposition to affirmative action, the “one big issue for
182
Not only has Thomas openly opposed
most black people.”

175. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 262.
176. Id.
177. Jeffrey Toobin, The Burden of Clarence Thomas, NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 1993, at 38,
41, 42.
178. For a general discussion on the complex alienation Thomas has faced within the Black
community, see Michael Dehaven Newsom, Clarence Thomas, Victim? Perhaps, and Victimizer?
Yes—A Study in Social and Racial Alienation from African-Americans, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 327
(2004).
179. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 3, 12, 19. In 1998, the Joint Center for Political
and Economic Studies determined that Thomas had only a 32 percent favorability rating among
African Americans, lower than any other “prominent black figure” the center’s political analyst
had ever examined. Id. at 4.
180. Id. at 271 (quoting Clarence Thomas). But cf. id. at 280 (“Clarence Thomas is not
looking to be a black leader. I’m sure he never applied. He will never fit in Thurgood Marshall’s
shoes. Those are not the shoes he wants to wear.” (quoting Donna Brazile)).
181. See id. at 19 (“Racial disillusionment is the common theme in all these
demonstrations—not ideology, not politics, but the seething sense that one of the potential
bright lights of the race has rejected his chance to shine.”).
182. Id. at 375 (“The civil rights movement has been boiled down to one big issue for most
black people . . . affirmative action. . . . It’s like riding on the anti-gay marriage platform in
Greenwich Village or Provincetown. . . . You’re going to be surprised when people are angry at
you?” (quoting Henry Louis Gates Jr., Director of Harvard’s W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for
African and African-American Research)).
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affirmative action, but he appears to go out of his way to decry many
civil rights legal principles—principles that are close to the hearts of
most African Americans.
Moreover, some contend that Thomas’s civil rights opinions are
bolder than other Justices, because he is willing to say things that “no
183
one [else] on the Court has the guts to say.” Even in cases in which
Thomas votes with the majority, as he did in Adarand, Jenkins, and
184
Parents Involved in Community Schools, he often writes separately
to express positions that are more absolute than those taken by the
185
186
majority. In Bush v. Vera, for example, Thomas was the only
Justice on the Court who was unwilling to assume, for the purposes of
the present case, that it was constitutional to intentionally create
187
majority-minority districts. Thomas’s bold separate opinions have
led some to characterize his civil rights jurisprudence as radical and
188
extreme. As Justice Stevens explained:
I would not find JUSTICE THOMAS’ extreme proposition—that there
is a moral and constitutional equivalence between an attempt to
subjugate and an attempt to redress the effects of a caste system—at
all persuasive. It is one thing to question the wisdom of affirmative-

183. GERBER, supra note 8, at 102 (quoting Robert Marquand, Thomas Leads Court’s Lean
to the Right, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 26, 1995, at 1). As discussed in Part III.C, for
example, Thomas was the first Justice to openly criticize the reasoning of Brown. See Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the Brown Court for
relying on social science to reach the conclusion that segregation in public schools is
unconstitutional).
184. See discussion supra Part III.C.
185. E.g., Richard J. Dougherty, Essay, A Response to Originalism and Precedent: Principles
and Practices in the Application of Stare Decisis, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 155, 170–71 (2007)
(describing how Thomas often writes separately to distinguish his views from those of the
majority).
186. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
187. See id. at 999 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, application of
strict scrutiny in this suit was never a close question. I cannot agree with JUSTICE O’CONNOR’s
assertion that strict scrutiny is not invoked by the intentional creation of majority-minority
districts.”). Additionally, whereas the Justices in the plurality insisted that race be the
predominant factor, Justice Thomas found legislative action offensive when race was merely one
motivation. Id. at 959 (plurality opinion) (“For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove
that other, legitimate districting principles were ‘subordinated’ to race. By that, we mean that
race must be ‘the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s [redistricting] decision.’ We
thus differ from JUSTICE THOMAS, who would apparently hold that it suffices that racial
considerations be a motivation for the drawing of a majority-minority district.” (citations
omitted)).
188. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 n.5 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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action programs . . . . It is another thing altogether to equate the
many well-meaning and intelligent lawmakers . . . who have
supported affirmative action over the years, to segregationists and
189
bigots.

Although Thomas’s opinions seem designed to renounce
orthodox civil rights jurisprudence, race remains central to his judicial
190
identity. Despite the criticism Thomas has received from African
Americans, he continues to view himself as a noble civil rights soldier,
doing “what he has to do” to challenge the conventional wisdom, just
as Marshall and other leaders of the civil rights movement did what
191
they had to in the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, Thomas believes
that he has been unfairly vilified by African Americans because he is
192
unwilling to surrender the fight for true racial equality.
And Thomas believes that, just like the civil rights leaders before
193
him, he must suffer for his ideas before they can be vindicated. In
front of a conservative audience at the Walter D. George School of
Law, Thomas spoke of a “new brand of stereotypes and ad hominem
assaults,” designed to target independent-minded African Americans,

189. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
190. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 10 (“Even as Thomas goes about his work,
perhaps the purest conservative on the court, it’s his racial identity that most defines
him. . . . [T]he racial prism . . . is the prism through which Thomas often views himself.”).
191. See id. at 23 (“The courageous underdog is one of his favorite personas, adopted by him
in countless speeches and observed by friends in private conversation. Putting on his battle
armor—seeing himself as a man under attack for his ideas—is one of the ways that Thomas
copes with the ostracism he endures from blacks who disagree with him. . . . [Thomas] has
turned himself into the most successful victim in America.”); see also id. at 231 (“Having an
enemy to fight is what links Thomas and the conservative faithful.”).
192. See id. at 226 (“[M]y only choice was to stand up for my views or abandon them . . . to
turn and run from myself, to abandon my views without being convinced that they were the
wrong views.” (quoting Clarence Thomas)); see also GERBER, supra note 8, at 33 (“Does a black
man instantaneously become ‘insensitive,’ a ‘dupe’ or an ‘Uncle Tom,’ because he happens to
disagree with the policy of affirmative action?” (quoting Clarence Thomas, Speech Delivered at
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, May 1, 1993)).
193. See Toobin, supra note 177, at 40 (“Thomas said that when he arrived in Washington,
people with beliefs such as his, especially blacks, were dismissed as ‘sellouts’ or ‘insensitive’ and
that as a Reagan Administration official he had been called ‘an ultra-conservative.’ He added—
as if such addition were necessary—‘Later, I would be called worse things.’ It was time now ‘for
regrouping and rejuvenation,’ he said. ‘As I look out in the audience today, I see hope.’”); see
also supra note 11; cf. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 337 (“[Thomas] discussed the
confirmation battle in terms usually reserved for religious allegory . . . . ‘I watched in horror as
people who claimed to be on the side of some greater good tore at my very soul,’ Thomas said.
‘But . . . I found strength by running toward God . . . . [T]he burdens of unfairness and
frustration became an opportunity to be virtue[ous].’”).
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like himself, who “dare to question current social and cultural
194
gimmicks,” or “dare to disagree with the latest ideological fad.” In
this new world of bigotry, segregation on the basis of “color” has
195
given way to segregation of the basis of “[n]onconforming [i]deas.”
As a result, Thomas claimed, he has been forced to “pay for [his]
ideological
trespasses”
through
“systematic
character
assassination[s],” which he called “the modern-day version of the old
196
public floggings.”
In truth, Thomas’s rhetoric is somewhat exaggerated. The civil
rights protestors of the mid-twentieth century were forced to endure
tear gas, fire hoses, and billy clubs, whereas Thomas’s “modern-day
197
flogging” mostly consists of fairly ordinary public scrutiny. Thomas,
198
199
who is notoriously sensitive to criticism, is nothing if not dramatic.
He frequently compares his critics to slave-owners and Ku Klux Klan
200
members, drawing “absurd” analogies “between the difficult but
routine challenges that public figures must weather and the most
201
oppressive and vile chapter in American history.” Although the
specifics of his analogies vary, Thomas always casts himself as the
courageous victim who dares to think independently, and he always
casts his critics as the narrow-minded bigots who are out to demean
him:
For daring to reject the ideological orthodoxy that was prescribed
for blacks by liberal whites, I was branded a traitor to my race—as if
anyone . . . had the right to tell me what beliefs a black man was
permitted to hold. If I dared to step out of line, if I refused to be

194. Toobin, supra note 177, at 39 (quoting Clarence Thomas).
195. Id. at 40 (“Instead of seeing signs on public doors saying ‘No Coloreds Allowed,’ the
signs were ‘No Nonconforming Ideas Allowed.’” (quoting Clarence Thomas)).
196. Id. (quoting Clarence Thomas).
197. See id. at 40–41 (“Thomas has, to be sure, endured tough public criticism from liberal
opponents. But to go along with the suggestion that Thomas and the civil-rights protestors faced
similar obstacles—and displayed comparable courage—may well be to take an unduly
sympathetic view of the difficulties the Justice has faced.”).
198. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 230 (“Famously thin-skinned . . . Thomas
has amazing recall for slights and critiques he feels are unfair to him. To deliver a tough
assessment that reaches him is to risk forever being locked, unfavorably, in his memory.”); see
also id. at 186 (“[Thomas] is fiercely loyal to those who have helped him and holds long grudges
against those who haven’t.”).
199. Id. at 368 (“Sometimes, Thomas hunts ants with grenades.”).
200. Id. at 367; see also THOMAS, supra note 2, at 241–60 (describing his confirmation
process in a chapter egregiously entitled “Invitation to a Lynching”).
201. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 367–68.
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another invisible man, then I wasn’t really black, I was an Uncle
202
Tom doing Massa’s bidding.

More than anything, however, Thomas views himself as
203
misunderstood. He believes that he has “embrace[d] the values that
have worked” for African Americans, and “reject[ed] those that have
204
failed.” In his own mind, he is fighting for a “positive” civil rights
205
agenda, rather than merely fighting against affirmative action. In a
speech to a national audience of African-American lawyers in 1998,
Thomas made a heartfelt attempt to correct this misunderstanding:
It pains me deeply—more deeply than any of you can imagine—to
be perceived by so many members of my race as doing them
harm. . . . All the sacrifice, all the long hours of preparation were to
help, not to hurt. . . . I have come here today not in anger or to
anger. . . . Nor have I come to defend my views, but rather to assert
my right to think for myself, to refuse to have my ideas assigned to
206
me as though I was an intellectual slave because I am black.

Despite Thomas’s desire to be embraced by African Americans
as a civil rights hero of his time, he seems to have lost faith in his own
generation. He no longer hopes to convert his political opponents,

202. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 184.
203. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 5, 176. Aubrey Immelman, “an expert at
developing personality profiles of public figures,” has studied Thomas thoroughly and
concluded that “Thomas [is] a discontented man who ‘views himself as misunderstood.’ He
wants to reach out to those who don’t understand him . . . but fears getting hurt, and fears
failure and humiliation. So he . . . has a tendency to be judgmental and inflexible. He’s a very
critical individual, not that accepting of others’ flaws and shortcomings.” Id. at 5 (quoting
Aubrey Immelman).
204. Toobin, supra note 177, at 39.
205. See Masugi, supra note 91, at 232 (“[Thomas] wanted a positive, principled civil rights
policy that was also consistent with a political and social agenda that respected individual
liberty.”); see also MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 302 (“It’s not that I’m against the
advancement of the race . . . it’s that our strategy for advancement has got to change.” (quoting
Clarence Thomas)); cf. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 178 (“My main quarrel with the Reagan
administration was that I thought it needed a positive civil-rights agenda, instead of merely
railing against quotas and affirmative action. This was my top priority at EEOC: to do what I
could to make things better for ordinary people.”).
206. Justice Clarence Thomas, Address to the National Bar Association, Memphis,
Tennessee (July 29, 1998), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec98/thomas_
7-29.html; see also MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 23 (“Nowhere in public will you see
[Thomas] more alive, more rebellious, less cautious, more at ease than in a roomful of black
conservatives. Here, he can scan the crowd and see people like himself. Here, he can promote
his views to an amen chorus, still be black and not scorned.”).
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only to outlive them. Instead, Thomas has placed his faith in the
fresh minds of African-American children, for whom he always
makes time:
[Thomas] spotted a group of black fourth and fifth graders from a
private academy and, hoping to inspire them, sidled over. This was
vintage Thomas, always drawn to the children in a room. . . .
. . . In children, Thomas sees uncluttered minds, fresh
possibilities, hope—the hope that maybe they won’t prejudge him,
won’t view him through the lens of their elders, some of whom he
believes are stuck on old ideas. Maybe they will grow up to become
independent thinkers, which is how Thomas sees himself. So he’s
208
never too busy for the kids. . . .

This anecdote demonstrates Thomas’s hope that the next
generation of African Americans will embrace his equal protection
jurisprudence, ushering in a new era of African-American thought.
Only then can Thomas solidify his legacy as the great civil rights
leader he believes himself to be.
B. Writing for the Future
For Thomas, Harlan and his renowned civil rights dissents
209
demonstrate how unpopular opinions can prevail with time.
Although Harlan was sometimes called the “Great Dissenter” in the
early twentieth century, the label primarily referred to his tax and
210
antitrust dissents. Harlan’s contemporaries largely dismissed his
211
civil rights dissents as moralizing and eccentric. Not until Brown
“sent scholars scrambling to study him” was Harlan, “the lone
champion of black civil rights on the turn-of-the century Court,”
212
finally “hailed as a prophet.”
Thus, it was not Harlan’s civil rights dissents themselves that
earned Harlan his legacy of greatness, but rather society’s

207. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 22 (“In public and in private, [Thomas]
loved telling people that he planned to work out vigorously so that he could live a long life, stay
on the court for forty or fifty years, and outlast all his critics.”).
208. Id. at 2–3.
209. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 250.
210. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 16, at 8.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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determination that his dissents were correct. History vindicated
Harlan only because his opinions accurately foreshadowed a change
213
in the law. Despite the fact that Harlan’s dissents were not even
mentioned in the 1953 edition of the Encyclopedia of American
History, for example, “Harlan made it onto a list of great judges in
214
1958 primarily on the weight of those dissents.” Now, when Harlan
is called the Court’s “first great dissenter,” the label celebrates his
215
civil rights dissents.
Part of the reason that Thomas relates to Harlan, this Note
contends, is because Thomas’s contemporaries often dismiss him just
as Harlan’s contemporaries dismissed Harlan at the turn of the
216
twentieth century. Scholars often question Thomas’s significance as
217
218
a Justice, dismissing Thomas as peculiar and irrelevant. To some
extent, Thomas’s radical ideology and stubborn temperament have
reduced his contemporary significance on the Court. As “the most
219
conservative” Justice on the Court, Thomas is more willing than
some of his ideological allies to “extend[] his line of thinking to its
logical conclusion, regardless of the disruptive effects a ruling would
220
have on American society.” Furthermore, Thomas is rarely willing
221
to compromise even on small points. As a result, Thomas is “not
222
much of a player in his workplace.” He is “ideologically isolated”

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., The Supreme Court: A New Kind of Justice (PBS television broadcast Jan. 31,
2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/about/index.html (“The [Civil Rights
Cases], besides re-writing the nation’s long-running racial drama, would produce the Supreme
Court’s first great dissent . . . and its first great dissenter.” (emphasis added)).
216. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 250.
217. When Thomas is dismissed as peculiar, it is likely because of his strange
nonparticipation during oral arguments. See TOOBIN, supra note 3, at 103 (calling Thomas
“embarrassingly silent” on the Court). The characteristic has led some to question his
intelligence and his dedication. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 309–10 (“[Thomas’s]
silence has taken a toll on Thomas’s reputation. It has even led clerks for other Justices to
wonder whether Thomas is just not as bright as some of his colleagues. Or, perhaps, just
intellectually lazy.”).
218. TOOBIN, supra note 3, at 99–101.
219. Id.
220. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 333.
221. TOOBIN, supra note 3, at 103.
222. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 9.
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and “strategically marginal,” having written a body of majority
224
opinions that is “notably thin on constitutionally significant cases.”
Following Harlan’s path, Thomas seeks to influence the law
through passionate separate opinions, rather than through coalitions
225
with his fellow Justices. In the Court’s more momentous cases,
“Thomas’s voice is most often heard in strongly worded dissents and
226
concurrences that he believes one day will become law.” Writing
separately, Thomas is able to distinguish his beliefs from those of his
colleagues and eternalize his role as an individual Justice. Moreover,
through his separate opinions, Thomas is able to preserve his ideas
until the country is ready to vindicate them.
Thomas’s lonely separate opinions may make him appear
marginalized and inconsequential to scholars. And perhaps Thomas
is, for scholars of his generation. But Thomas may not write his
separate opinions for his contemporaries—perhaps he writes them for
the future. As a proponent of natural law, Thomas likely believes that
the United States is on a divine mission, and that his views are an
227
inevitable part of that mission. But as confident as Thomas may be
that his views will be vindicated, without his separate opinions there
would be little for the next generation to celebrate if and when that
day comes. Like Harlan, Thomas has sacrificed his significance and
relevancy on the Court so that he, through his words, can become
significant in legacy.
CONCLUSION
Thomas views himself as an honorable civil rights soldier who
has sacrificed his contemporary reputation to fulfill an ideal that the
founders promised, that Abraham Lincoln proclaimed, and of which
Martin Luther King, Jr., dreamed. In this crusade, Thomas has used
Harlan’s words and principles to manipulate the meaning of Brown in
favor of his own equal protection philosophy. He has read Harlan’s
colorblind Constitution to endorse an ideology identical to his own. In
223. TOOBIN, supra note 3, at 103; see also MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 282
(“[H]is years on the court have been marked by strongly worded dissents and concurrences that
prod and provoke but leave him on the margins of influence . . . .”).
224. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 9.
225. Id. (“[Thomas] seems happiest when playing the lone wolf, drafting provocative
dissents that he hopes—believes—might one day become law.”).
226. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
227. See discussion supra Part II.

176

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:139

Harlan’s words, Thomas sees the very reasons he is conservative and
the very foundation of his own judicial philosophy. In Harlan’s
principles, Thomas sees the cause for which he claims to have
suffered and the hope by which he perseveres. In Harlan’s story,
Thomas sees the possibility of redemption.
But only when his lonely opinions foreshadow a change in the
law, as Harlan’s did, can Thomas assume his position in the history
books as one of the Court’s “great dissenters” and as one of the
United States’ prophetic leaders of civil rights. Therefore, when
Thomas encounters a classification on the basis of race, he writes with
a passion intended not only for the contemporary reader but also for
the history books. He writes categorically and consistently, and he
articulates his colorblind perspective with fervor unrivaled by his
fellow Justices. When Thomas writes a civil rights opinion that could
be considered radical or extreme, he does so for a different
generation. But as Thomas himself has shown, aspiring prophets
come with their own agendas, and words are easy to manipulate.

